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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AND SECTORAL UNIONS IN CHINA
ELI D. FRIEDMAN*
Drawing on qualitative fieldwork in China’s Guangdong and Zhejiang 
Provinces, the author asks how post- socialist unions respond to 
worker unrest and why the development of sectoral- level bargaining 
has been uneven in different regions of China. While Zhejiang has 
had relative success in establishing the organizational infrastructure 
for sectoral bargaining, Guangdong has had little success despite on-
going attempts by unions. The author explains variation in sectoral- 
level bargaining through an analysis of the different models of 
economic development, which are characterized as local entrepre-
neurialism and global integration for Zhejiang and Guangdong, re-
spectively. Despite having different organizational forms, unions in 
both places suffer from a lack of credibility and capacity to enforce 
contracts. Given the ACFTU’s ongoing focus on sectoral- level bar-
gaining, however, experiments will likely continue in various regions 
and industries throughout China.
How do post- socialist unions attempt to deal with the problem of labor instability under capitalist transformation? Specifically, what—if any—
identifiable system of labor relations are unions in China pursuing, and 
what sorts of structural constraints do they face? My general argument is as 
follows: On the one hand, sectoral- level negotiation is particularly attractive 
to the state and unions,1 as it offers a way to improve conditions for workers 
within the given institutional and political parameters (namely the ban on 
independent unions). On the other hand, the possibility for success is highly 
circumscribed by both economic and political factors. Economically, diverse 
approaches to regional development within China present different possi-
bilities for establishing the institutional infrastructure within which sectoral- 
level negotiation can take place. And politically, the weakness of official 
unions at the point of production renders contract enforcement tenuous to 
nonexistent. Thus, the post- socialist political framework encourages unions 
*Eli D. Friedman is Assistant Professor at the ILR School’s Department of International and Compara-
tive Labor, Cornell University. The author thanks Peter Evans, Kim Voss, Kevin O’Brien, Ching Kwan 
Lee, Zongshi Chen, and Sarosh Kuruvilla for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this article. 
Thanks also to Tom Kochan for providing the opportunity to receive useful feedback on the paper at the 
MIT Institute for Work and Employment Research. Hao Zhang provided invaluable research assistance. 
Funding for this research was provided by the University of California’s Pacific Rim Research Program.
1 I have translated the official term jiti xieshang as “collective negotiation” rather than “collective con-
sultation” to avoid confusion for English speakers.
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to pursue sectoral- level negotiation while simultaneously undermining the 
possibility of its realization.
In this article I show that sectoral- level negotiation has been a primary 
means by which the leadership of the All- China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) has attempted to reduce labor unrest by improving conditions for 
workers. By focusing on the rather exceptional case of Zhejiang Province, I 
show that distinct regional models of economic development produce varia-
tions in the capacity of unions to engage in collective negotiation. In con-
sidering external economic conditions, I demonstrate that it is not merely 
control by the state—the factor most discussed in the literature—that deter-
mines union activity. Despite Zhejiangese unions being more successful 
than their counterparts in other parts of the country at concluding sectoral- 
level agreements, a crisis of legitimacy undermines the capacity to enforce 
such agreements.
A small amount of scholarship in English already exists on the develop-
ment of sectoral negotiation in China (Liu 2010; Pringle 2011). Given that 
unions in southeastern Zhejiang Province have been widely hailed by the 
ACFTU as the most successful in this field, research has quite logically fo-
cused on this region. Empirically, I aim to intervene in three ways: First, my 
findings on the outcomes of sectoral- level negotiation in Zhejiang are quite 
different from those reported in existing research, particularly with regard 
to the issue of implementation. Second, I bring the development of sectoral 
negotiation in Zhejiang into comparative perspective through an abbrevi-
ated discussion of the experiences of unions in Guangdong—the province 
many scholars consider to be at the forefront of union innovation (Liu 
2011; Friedman 2013). This brings into clear relief that which is peculiar to 
Zhejiang. Third, I draw linkages between distinct regional political econo-
mies and the divergent possibilities that are thereby produced for pursuing 
sector- wide collective negotiation. Concretely, I argue that patterns of capi-
tal mobility, origin of investment, levels of economic diversification, and the 
existence of legitimate employer associations are key factors in determining 
whether sectoral- level negotiation will be possible (Table 1). I contend that 
Zhejiang appears more likely to enact a region- based approach to collective 
negotiation while areas more dependent on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
are headed toward a firm- based approach. Finally, I show theoretically how 
post- socialist labor institutions are paradoxically both a facilitating and a 
constraining factor in the development of sectoral unions.
Post- Socialist Trade Unions and Sectoral Negotiation
As argued by Crowley and Ost (2001), Clarke, and others, post- socialist 
unions exhibit fundamental weakness in places as diverse as China, Vietnam 
(Clarke, Lee, and Chi 2007), Russia (Clarke 2005), and throughout Eastern 
Europe (Crowley 2004). In general, post- socialist unions remain weak be-
cause they are institutionally dependent either on the state, employers, or 
both.
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The state- run ACFTU is no exception. While debate continues as to 
whether Chinese unions suffer from a “double identity” (Chen 2003a)—
stuck between the state and workers—or are simply agents of the state (Lau 
2003), there is consensus that they are weak (Chen 2003b) and do not ac-
tively represent workers (Taylor and Li 2007). Unions are formally subordi-
nate to the Communist Party at all levels of the hierarchy, while at the same 
time they are de facto subordinate to management at the level of the firm. 
Management exercises significant control over selection of union represen-
tatives within enterprises (Howell 2008), even in the unusual instances 
where strong external pressures push for democratic elections (Yu 2008). 
The consequence is that enterprise- level union representatives are typically 
selected from a company’s human resources department. Furthermore, 
unions do not lead strikes, therefore members are deprived of their primary 
form of leverage vis- à- vis employers.
But if unions in China and other post- socialist countries are structurally 
weak, this “does not mean the diminution of class anger” (Crowley and Ost 
2001: 5). In this respect China and Vietnam are quite different from Eastern 
Europe in that workers are now highly mobilized, albeit outside the control 
of unions (Lee 2007; Chan 2010). As a result, Chinese unions have been 
searching for a response to generalized worker insurgency, a process that 
has involved many experiments among regional unions (Liu 2010; Pringle 
2011), which raises the possibility of varying forms of labor relations within 
a single country (Locke 1992).
The umbrella of the ACFTU covers a variety of types of unions. The gov-
ernment has encouraged and strengthened the regionally based union fed-
erations (existing at the provincial, municipal, and often district, county, 
township, and street level, depending on administrative arrangements) 
while the nationally organized industrial unions (chanye gonghui) remain 
quite weak. The primary unit of the trade union system exists at the enter-
prise level and is supposed to be administered by an elected chair and a 
union committee. Most significant for this research, sectoral unions (hangye 
gonghui) are organizations, typically established at the municipal level, that 
aim to organize all of the employers in a specific industry within their juris-
diction to either engage in collective negotiation or provide legal and other 
types of assistance to workers.
Collective negotiation has been high on the agenda of the ACFTU for a 
number of years. China’s employment relations were largely remade during 
the process of marketization, as initially marked by the enactment of the 
Labor Law in 1995. This law encouraged signing of labor contracts and pro-
vided the basis for experimentation with collective contracts. Unions within 
the structure of the ACFTU are granted the legal right to represent employ-
ees in these negotiations. Although in theory various forms of unions are 
empowered to engage in collective negotiation, in practice this has mostly 
happened at the enterprise level. Particularly in the private sector, unions 
have had little success in collective negotiation. Because enterprise union 
chairs are frequently subject to unchecked retaliation and there are no legal 
484 ILRREVIEW
strikes, employers have few incentives to take negotiation seriously—or even 
to enforce the law (Cooney 2007).
Endemic legal and contractual violations in Chinese workplaces have 
been well documented in scholarly, journalistic, and NGO reports.2 As I will 
show, it is the very weakness of post- socialist trade unions at the enterprise 
level that resulted in non-implementation of the collective contract in the 
Rui’an eyeglass industry. Given that my results differ from Liu (2010) and 
Pringle (2011) in this regard, which conditions are likely to facilitate en-
forcement in the Chinese context is still unclear. Nonetheless, the ACFTU 
hopes that sectoral negotiation will yield better results in contract imple-
mentation.
As described by Clarke and Pringle (2009: 96), sectoral negotiation has 
also come into favor with post- socialist unions in Russia and Vietnam. Sec-
toral negotiation is a particularly attractive option when membership mobi-
lization is off the table and maintenance of good relationships with the state 
and employers is of paramount importance. Based on my own research in 
China, this is the case for several reasons: First, establishing sectoral stan-
dards can be in the interests of a segment of employers. Second, such a 
project can gain support from the local and national government, particu-
larly if it has the effect of rationalizing labor relations and reducing conflict. 
And finally, because such an approach to negotiation is typically conducted 
in a top- down manner workers will likely remain demobilized. Especially in 
an environment in which unions have good access to the state bureaucracy 
but cannot depend on their membership as a source of political power, an 
administrative approach to collective negotiation is much more feasible. 
The ACFTU’s commitment to increasing the prevalence of sectoral negotia-
tion was indicated by the 2006 promulgation of “Advice on Conducting 
 Regional Sectoral Collective Negotiation.” This official document estab-
lished guidelines to determine when such an approach is appropriate and 
how to select representatives as well as the content and process of bargain-
ing (Zhang and Shi 2012: 52). Sectoral negotiation is therefore a major 
trend worthy of further investigation.
Although research on such topics in China is just now emerging, research 
exists on the preconditions for successful sectoral bargaining in wealthy lib-
eral democracies. In analyzing collective bargaining in the Organisation for 
Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD), Traxler identified 
three key factors in the development of multiemployer bargaining: strong 
unions, strong employer associations, and a supportive state (1998: 213). In 
China, illegitimacy of unions creates problems with “vertical coordination” 
(Traxler 2003: 197)—that is, gaining acceptance from the rank and file—
implying that the latter two categories will likely be of greater relevance. 
More recent literature from the West has analyzed the effects of neoliberal 
2 For one prominent recent example, see SACOM, accessed at http://sacom.hk.report- apple- fails- in- 
its- responisbility- to- monitor- suppliers- 2/ (February 26, 2013).
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globalization on established multiemployer bargaining systems and called 
into question the sustainability of such arrangements (Lindbeck and Snower 
2001). Although decentralization of bargaining has appeared in many 
places, national- level sectoral bargaining systems have responded to increas-
ing competitive pressures in various ways (Katz 1993; Marginson, Sisson, 
and Arrowsmith 2003).
Although state capacity is a key factor in determining the development of 
sectoral negotiation, it is crucial to have well- established employer associa-
tions in place. Since employers tend to have less need than do workers to act 
collectively to realize their interests (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980), the ques-
tion is what are the conditions under which employers will seek to associate 
and bargain collectively with labor. Behrens (2004) has argued that strong 
unions, state action, or collective- action problems are key factors in encour-
aging employer associations to act (and that any one of these factors may be 
sufficient).
Particularly in China, which does not have strong unions, issues of em-
ployer collective- action problems are crucial. China has two nationally orga-
nized employer associations, the China Enterprise Confederation–China 
Enterprise Directors Association (CEC- CEDA) and the All- China Federation 
of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC). In part because of a lack of legitimacy 
among employers (Ma 2011), these organizations have infrequently played 
a role in facilitating sectoral negotiation. While there have been moments 
when such organizations have behaved in a corporatist manner (Pearson 
1994), they are certainly not the type of representative organizations found 
in other countries. As a result, individual employers (Traxler 1993: 686) or 
local employer organizations such as those in Zhejiang (see below) may be 
more likely to play an important role in establishing multiemployer bar-
gaining.
An increasingly globalized economy is likely to pose challenges to the 
sustainability of employer associations—and therefore sectoral agree-
ments—as capital has become increasingly mobile. In this sense, distinct 
approaches to development present different obstacles and opportunities 
for the realization of sectoral negotiation.
A Distinct Path to Prosperity in Zhejiang
The dominant narrative in explaining sustained growth in China is that FDI 
and massive state- owned enterprises have sustained the economy, while do-
mestic private industry has played an auxiliary and relatively minor role 
(Huang and Khanna 2003: 75). While some recognize the spatial and sec-
toral unevenness of FDI (Broadman and Sun 1997), the overall consensus is 
that foreign investment is good for growth (Chen, Chang, and Zhang 1995) 
and, despite possible political drawbacks (Eng 1997; Gallagher 2002, 2005), 
that it is a fundamental part of the story of development in China (Tseng 
and Zebregs 2003).
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Indeed, total FDI more than doubled from US$40.3 billion in 1999 to 
$92.4 billion in 2008,3 making China the largest FDI recipient in the world. 
But this narrative about China’s development does not reflect the “local en-
trepreneurialism” that has driven growth in Zhejiang. Places that have re-
ceived more attention in the literature such as Guangdong are in fact 
characterized by deep “global integration.” The key factors that define these 
two models and that determine the likelihood of sectoral negotiation are 
summarized in Table 1. We will see that local entrepreneurialism in Zhejiang 
results in greater capacity to establish the institutional framework for en-
couraging sector- wide negotiation. The story of the “global integration” 
path to development has been written about extensively (Huang 2003), but 
the broad outlines are worth re- emphasizing in order to bring the distinct 
character of Zhejiang’s development into clearer focus. Guangdong Prov-
ince best exemplifies this model.
Following Deng Xiaoping’s rehabilitation and rise to power, the govern-
ment formally announced the beginning of market reforms in 1978. By 
1980, four special economic zones had been established in China, three of 
which were in Guangdong Province. These special zones, along with a num-
ber of “coastal open cities” that were established in 1984, provided foreign 
investors with a highly favorable regulatory environment—a setup that pro-
duced years of strong growth (Pak 1997). A massive influx of migrant work-
ers from the countryside (Solinger 1999) provided a cheap and flexible 
source of labor, and the Pearl River Delta quickly came to be the country’s 
top destination for FDI (Chen, Chang, and Zhang 1995). By the early 21st 
century, the region had become the world’s premier manufacturing center, 
a development that allowed for a radical reconfiguration of global supply 
chains (Lichtenstein 2009).
Of crucial importance is the extent to which this process was driven by 
foreign investors (Gallagher 2005), particularly those in the Chinese com-
munities in Hong Kong, Taiwan (Hsing 1998), and Southeast Asia. This 
heavy reliance on foreign investment caused many observers to come to the 
conclusion that China’s development as a whole has not been driven by 
 domestic private firms. If by 2007 more than 61% of Guangdong’s total 
3 PRC Ministry of Finance. Accessed at http://www.uschina.org/statistics/fdi_cumulative.html (Sep-
tember 10, 2009).
Table 1. Models of Development
Local entrepreneurialism (Zhejiang) Global integration (Guangdong)
Origin of investment Local Transnational
Capital mobility Low High
Economic diversification Low (single commodity village) High (diverse manufacturing, 
 public sector, finance, 
 trade, service, etc.)
Employer associations Full membership/high legitimacy Segmented/nonexistent
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industrial output derived from foreign- owned enterprises, that number was 
only 26.6% in Zhejiang.
A significant body of literature on labor in FDI- fueled Guangdong already 
exists (Lee 1995, 1998, 2007; Chan 2001; Thireau and Hua 2003; Pun 2005; 
Pun, Chan, and Chan 2009) and, in particular, concerning the Pearl River 
Delta. The global integration of this region has produced a certain set of 
possibilities for labor. Briefly, the local state and unions have encountered 
severe obstacles in disciplining highly cosmopolitan and footloose capital or 
persuading employers to participate in interest- aggregating business associ-
ations. Despite the desire of unions in the region to pursue collective nego-
tiation at the sectoral level, they have had little success. As a result, collective 
negotiation has generally proceeded at the enterprise level.
Although not well known internationally, Zhejiang’s local entrepreneur-
ialism stands in contrast to the typical story about development in China 
(Y.- L. Liu 1992; Nee and Opper 2012). Zhejiang’s output of RMB313 per 
capita in 1978 made it only the thirteenth wealthiest province in China,4 but 
by 2009 that number had skyrocketed to RMB44,383—just RMB200 behind 
the front- runner, Jiangsu.5
Perhaps the most significant indicator of the extent to which Zhejiang 
differs from the global integration model is the percentage of output that 
derives from foreign- invested firms. In 2003, a modest 20.1% of output in 
Zhejiang came from foreign firms, and that number crept up to 26.64% by 
2007.6 While being one- quarter of the economy is clearly of significance, it 
pales in comparison to Guangdong’s massive reliance on foreign invest-
ment. In 2007, 61.05% of output in Guangdong came from foreign firms.7
4 Accessed at http://www.zhejiang.gov.cn/gb/node2/node1619/node1622/userobject13ai697.html 
(September 10, 2009).
5 Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2010. Beijing: zhongguo tongji chubanshe.
6 Zhejiang tongji nianjian 2008. Beijing: zhongguo tongji chubanshe.
7 Guangdong tongji nianjian 2008. Beijing: zhongguo tongji chubanshe.
Table 2. Foreign Investment in Zhejiang, 2007
Location
Value of utilization of 
foreign capital (US$)
Value of utilization of 
foreign capital per capita (US$)
Northeast
 Hangzhou 5,580,590,000 830
 Ningbo 4,501,070,000 797
 Shaoxing 2,365,160,000 542
 Jiaxing 3,455,120,000 1,026
Southeast
 Wenzhou 1,049,444,000 137
 Jinhua 373,352,000 81
 Taizhou 816,810,000 144
Sources: Zhejiang tongji nianjian 2008. Beijing: zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 
p. 564; Zhejiang Economic Census Yearbook 2004. Beijing: China Statistics 
Press, pp. 7–16.
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But when we dip below the provincial level of aggregation in Zhejiang, 
the story becomes a bit more complex. The northeast part of the province, 
with its close proximity to Shanghai, is much more integrated into national 
and international circuits of capital, commodities, and labor. The southeast, 
in contrast, has been historically isolated and dependent on indigenous en-
terprise. One consequence of this variation is that the amount of foreign 
investment in the two regions has differed remarkably.
Physical separation, historically poor infrastructure, and a relatively low 
international profile make it unsurprising that the city in the southeast that 
has had the most success with FDI, Taizhou, has foreign investment per cap-
ita that is only slightly more than one- tenth of Jiaxing’s. The three south-
eastern municipalities are exemplary of local entrepreneurialism and are 
thus the focus of this research.
The distinctive model of development found in southeastern Zhejiang 
started in the city of Wenzhou (Bramall 1989). As the Cultural Revolution 
drew to a close, and with political leadership unable and/or unwilling to 
stop it,8 experiments with household- based commodity production began 
to take off. Whereas in 1980 only 1% of industrial output in Wenzhou came 
from private firms, by 1988 that number jumped to an astonishing 41% 
(A. P. Liu 1992: 703). Between 1981 and 1985 the municipality’s gross indus-
trial output increased by 130% (Forster 1990: 57). With firms rarely exceed-
ing 100 employees, and more typically employing around 35 (Parris 1993: 
247) (all of whom would be hired from the locality), deep social integration 
was typical between workers and management in Wenzhou firms (Chen 
2008). An additional significant feature of this model was that villages in the 
region came to specialize in a single commodity (e.g., buttons, lighters, eye-
glasses, handbags, etc.) so that a large number of small enterprises produc-
ing the same good would be highly geographically concentrated. Although 
external competition eventually forced changes in the internal structure of 
firms, especially leading to an increase in hiring of migrant labor, local en-
terprises remain the bedrock of the local economy (Warner 1995; Wright 
2000; Tsai 2002; Tseng and Zebregs 2003; Wang 2004; Wu 2004; Wei, Li, and 
Wang 2007; Yu, Xu, and Jiang 2007).
Methods
This article is based on extensive qualitative fieldwork conducted from 2008 
to 2010. While my time was not spent continuously in one place, I was 
based in Guangzhou for approximately ten months, with six weeks spent in 
Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province. The focus of the article is the Rui’an Eyeglass 
Sectoral Union in Zhejiang. 9 For comparative context, I briefly discuss ex-
amples of sectoral union activity in Guangzhou. As indicated above, much 
8 Tsai (2002) and Zhang and Liu (2013) have written in detail about how local officials provided neces-
sary cover for the development of private capital markets in Wenzhou.
9 Rui’an is a county- level city within the jurisdiction of Wenzhou.
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of the research on labor in China has focused on Guangdong. Including 
Guangzhou as a touchstone will help in contextualizing the Zhejiang case 
and will illustrate the emerging diversity in forms of labor relations. In both 
places I examined sectoral unions that were considered exemplary by union 
officials, with the understanding that the most successful cases would reveal 
something about union capacity, aspirations, and future possibilities.
I selected these cases for specific reasons. Zhejiang and Guangdong are 
two of the wealthiest provinces in China, as well as the most industrialized. 
They also have some of the highest levels of labor unrest. As a result, it is 
reasonable to assume that these provinces would be among the first to de-
velop new industrial relations systems. Additionally, they are quite represen-
tative of the distinct models of development presented in Table 1—global 
integration in the case of Guangdong and local entrepreneurialism in the 
case of Zhejiang.
Data presented in the case studies are collected from in- depth interviews 
and informal conversations with workers, managers, officials from the 
union, employers’ associations, and government, as well as from official 
documents, media reports, and publicly available statistics. In Rui’an, I in-
terviewed managers from ten eyeglass firms and one dozen workers, whom 
I approached independently. I also interviewed a deputy chair of the Rui’an 
Federation of Trade Unions, one official from the Rui’an Labor Bureau, 
and the chair and deputy chair of the Eyeglass Employers Association. In 
Guangzhou I interviewed all three of the full- time staff of the construction 
union, the chair of the sanitation union (with whom I also spent several days 
on a tour of the United States), and ten street cleaners whom I encountered 
independently of the union. In addition, I interviewed and spent countless 
hours with high- level officials from the Guangzhou Federation of Trade 
Unions, which resulted in ethnographic data that are difficult to quantify.
A highly qualitative, microlevel approach is the type best suited for this 
study, particularly because of the Chinese political context. Often a tenuous 
relationship holds between what union and government officials say and 
what actually takes place on the ground. As a result, a comparison of formal 
bargaining arrangements in different regions may reveal important trends—
but until they are empirically verified on the ground, one cannot be sure of 
their validity. What this research lacks in representativeness and generaliz-
ability it makes up for in empirical accuracy. Additionally, it allows one to 
see the aspirations of employers and officials from the union and govern-
ment, and how those aspirations are frequently confounded in practice.
Sectoral Unions and Global Integration
The development of sectoral unions generally in Guangdong Province, and 
Guangzhou in particular, has been halting at best. But it has not been for 
lack of effort—the reform- minded chair of the Guangzhou Federation of 
Trade Unions (GZFTU) until 2012, Chen Weiguang, had pursued sectoral 
negotiations since at least 2007. And yet, Chen complained that sectoral 
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negotiation was greatly constrained by the fact that they do not have a “part-
ner”—that is, there is no party with which they can negotiate collective con-
tracts. One of the vice- chairs of the GZFTU was quite explicit about the 
problem when describing why in Guangzhou the unions were only focused 
on collective negotiation at the enterprise level: “Our sectoral unions are 
not mature, and . . . the employer associations are not mature. They [em-
ployer associations] are even less mature! So we don’t have an opponent.”10
Although Guangdong has employer associations, they are generally split 
along lines of nationality (e.g., the United States, European Union, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, etc. each has its own chamber of commerce). Some of these 
associations have been able to coordinate political lobbying efforts—most 
importantly in 2010–11, when a concerted effort from the Hong Kong 
Chamber of Commerce successfully derailed a new piece of labor legislation 
in Guangdong. Nonetheless, this political capacity is quite distinct from the 
ability to represent all, or a significant majority of, employers in a given in-
dustry in collective bargaining. The official associations that do exist either 
do not have adequate membership or are seen as illegitimate by employers. 
Under such conditions, it is incredibly difficult to establish wage agreements 
for an entire sector.
According to GZFTU leaders, the two best examples of sectoral unions in 
the province were the construction and sanitation workers’ unions. Never-
theless, neither of these unions had succeeded in negotiating collective 
 contracts or setting any kind of industry standards. One cadre from the 
 construction union argued that “the market economy is a presupposition, 
so there isn’t any need to intervene here [by negotiating wages].”11 This 
union’s activities were restricted to passing out legal information at con-
struction sites.
Efforts by the sanitation workers’ union had been similarly stymied. In 
the mid- 2000s the government deregulated the industry, and contracts were 
given to a variety of private companies. By 2008, there were more than 600 
companies involved in sanitation work in Guangzhou, including both do-
mestic and foreign- owned firms.12 With privatization came worsening condi-
tions for many workers, and in spring 2008 street cleaners in one of the 
industrial districts of Guangzhou went on strike. Shortly thereafter, the 
GZFTU decided to establish the Sanitation Workers Sectoral Union. But 
despite lots of attention from union leadership, the sectoral union was un-
able to address ongoing rights violations in the industry, which became ap-
parent when a succession of wildcat strikes took place from 2009 to 2013. At 
the time of writing, the municipal government has become involved in try-
ing to establish standards in the industry, a task the union was unable to ac-
complish.
10 Field notes, October 2009.
11 Interview, April 2009.
12 Field notes, December 2008.
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Furthermore, Guangzhou unions did not even attempt to develop sec-
toral unions in manufacturing until 2011, which is somewhat surprising 
given the centrality of this sector to the local economy. In general, one would 
expect organizing sectoral agreements in manufacturing to be more diffi-
cult than in the service sector or construction, since the latter are place spe-
cific. It is thus all the more surprising that more robust sectoral negotiation 
has developed in the seemingly mobile manufacturing sectors of Wenzhou.
Labor Relations in Zhejiang
Official statistics indicate that Zhejiang Province has been more successful 
with sectoral- level unionization and wage negotiation than has Guangdong 
(Table 3). In addition to the numbers indicated in the table, it is worth not-
ing that of the total number of workers covered by any sort of wage- only 
collective contract, 9.4% of those in Zhejiang are covered by sectoral- level 
agreements, more than double the 4.1% covered in Guangdong. This is 
strong evidence that enterprise- level negotiation is more prevalent in 
Guangdong than in Zhejiang, while sectoral negotiation is more prevalent 
in Zhejiang. And the advances with sectoral- level negotiation in Zhejiang 
would not have been possible without the existence of the province’s un-
usual employer associations.
Local Employer Associations
Although it has been largely ignored in the English- language literature, a 
significant amount of research has been conducted by Chinese scholars on 
the development of independent employer associations in Zhejiang (Wang 
2004; Wu 2004; Yu, Xu, and Jiang 2007). While these organizations still must 
be formally “attached” (guakao) to a parent state organ, their organizational 
structure and decision- making procedures are formally autonomous. They 
do not receive any funding from the state but, rather, are supported by 
membership dues. Some exceptions notwithstanding, their leadership- 
selection process is usually internally determined. As one indication of this 
trend, in 2003 77% of employer associations in Wenzhou reported that their 
chairs were selected according to their own internal rules (Yu, Huang, and 
Fang 2004: 37).
“Local entrepreneurialism” is reflected in the membership of employer 
organizations that are endowed with high levels of social capital. In describing 
Table 3. Wage- Only Collective Contracts (WCC), 2006
Province
Total 
workforce
No. of enterprises 
covered by sectoral WCC
No. of workers covered 
by sectoral WCC
% of workers covered 
by sectoral WCC
Zhejiang 31,723,800 6,311 346,413 1.1
Guangdong 52,500,900 4,062  84,889 0.16
Source: Zhongguo gonghui tongji nianjian 2007. Beijing: zhongguo tongji chubanshe.
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the process of setting up the eyeglasses employer association in Rui’an, the 
organization’s director said that since everybody already knew everybody, it 
was a relatively straightforward procedure.13 Of the nearly 100 eyeglasses 
manufacturers in the county- level city, only one is a joint venture (with 
 Taiwanese investors), and none are fully foreign- owned firms. Moreover, 
only two of the Chinese- owned enterprises are owned by people from cities 
other than Rui’an.14 A trade union official in Rui’an commented that mem-
bers of the employer association would listen to and obey their chair since 
“their relationships are like brothers.”15 The thick social networks tie to-
gether not just employers to other employers but also the business associa-
tion to the state. With retired government officials sometimes serving as 
officers in the employer association, it is often the case that representatives 
from each group have long- standing relationships with one another. These 
dense social ties were apparent at the numerous meals I attended in which 
various employers and officials from the employer association and govern-
ment would interact socially with one another. What this means is that the 
state and union may have not just administrative but also social resources at 
their disposal when they interact with employers.
Sectoral- Level Negotiation in Zhejiang
Starting in 2004, trade unions in certain industries in southeast Zhejiang 
began to successfully conclude sector- wide wage agreements that cover 
nearly all enterprises within a given city. This model has been most success-
ful in relatively labor- intensive industries in which a large number of small 
local employers in one particular industry are concentrated in a particular 
district. While the trade union has played a key role in signing such agree-
ments on behalf of workers, the impetus for setting wage standards has 
come largely from employers and the state after they became concerned 
about high turnover and excessive labor conflicts. In order to address this 
problem, an organizational innovation taking the form of sectoral trade 
unions was necessary. The establishment of sectoral unions mirrored the 
already existing employer association, thus creating the framework for mul-
tiemployer bargaining.
At least two scholars writing in English have discussed sectoral- level wage 
negotiations; both focus on industries in southeast Zhejiang.16 The broad 
outlines of the experiences of the Zeguo Water Pump Sectoral Union (Liu 
2010) and the Wenling Woolen Sweater Sectoral Union (Pringle 2011) are 
quite similar to what I found with the Rui’an Eyeglass Sectoral Union. But 
there is a crucial difference: while both Liu and Pringle were cautiously 
optimistic that these unions had successfully bargained and implemented 
13 Interview, July 2009.
14 Interview, December 2009.
15 Field notes, July 2009.
16 Some literature can also be found in Chinese, e.g., Chen and Huang 2008; Zhu 2008.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SECTORAL UNIONS IN CHINA 493
collective contracts, I uncovered something rather different. If the official 
story in Rui’an was remarkable in its parallels with these earlier cases, it was 
the case that the agreement that was supposed to regulate eyeglass produc-
tion was not actually being implemented. And yet my research, combined 
with these earlier studies, confirms that as an institutional form sectoral- level 
negotiation remains a possibility in the local entrepreneurial environment 
of Zhejiang, while such a setup is severely challenged by global integration 
in the Pearl River Delta and other regions (Chen and Huang 2008; Zhu 
2008).
The Rui’an Eyeglass Sectoral Union
Rui’an is a county- level city of 1.17 million residents that is administratively 
subordinate to Wenzhou municipality.17 As one of the more in dustrialized 
areas of Wenzhou, it exemplifies the “Wenzhou model” of dependence on 
small family- owned enterprises. Rui’an is best known for its productive in-
dustries, including shoes, textiles, handbags, small consumer goods, and 
the like. The focus of my research is the eyeglass sector that is centered in 
the small township of Mayu that employs more than 12,000 workers. For a 
number of years the government of Rui’an has been intent on becoming 
the pre- eminent eyeglass manufacturing center in the world, and they have 
begun to actively recruit international eyeglass brands to establish offices in 
the city.
After the first eyeglass factory was established in 1978, the sector in Rui’an 
grew quite rapidly for a number of years.18 Relying on the renowned 
Wenzhou- style family- based marketing networks, these producers first con-
quered domestic markets and then expanded internationally. By the late 
2000s, sales from the Rui’an eyeglass industry totaled more than 10 billion 
RMB, accounting for half of all nationwide eyeglass sales, and the Eyeglass 
Employers Association estimated that 60% of all eyeglasses worn in China 
were produced in Rui’an.
But with more entrants to the market during the 1990s came increased 
competition for skilled labor. Individual skilled workers began pitting em-
ployers against one another in an effort to increase their wages. Smaller, 
younger enterprises did not have the financial or knowledge- based re-
sources to conduct the comprehensive worker training programs that the 
larger and more established companies held. One result of this was that 
these smaller enterprises began to pilfer skilled workers from other enter-
prises by offering marginally higher piece rates. In a formal address, the 
chair of the Eyeglass Employers Association presented this as a very serious 
problem:
17 2008 nian rui’an shi guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao (2008 report on Rui’an’s eco-
nomic and social development). Accessed at http://www.ratj.gov.cn/tjgb/2008.htm (October 15, 2009).
18 The data in the proceeding section are derived primarily from official union documents.
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The need for technical personnel and skilled workers has been steadily in-
creasing within the industry, and using high salaries in hiring has been an inevi-
table decision for enterprises. “Cutting the ground out” from one another is al-
ready not a new phenomenon, and this has led to lack of order and chaos in 
enterprise employment. . . . According to the social security authorities, labor 
conflicts have been occurring continuously in the industry, which has led to a 
worsening of the employment environment, and the positive development of the 
industry has been restricted.19
Thus, in 2001 two of the largest eyeglass firms in Rui’an took the initiative in 
trying to establish sector- wide standards, and they began to appeal to the 
Eyeglass Employers Association for assistance.
The Rui’an Eyeglass Employers Association was previously a formal state- 
sponsored organization. Eventually, the local government decided to “give 
them freedom,”20 which meant greater organizational autonomy but also 
implied responsibility for raising their own operating expenses. The associa-
tion now operates as an independent organization and is 100% dependent 
on membership dues for its operations. Often new laws and regulations that 
are of relevance to the industry are disseminated through the association. 
As one official from the local labor department said, “These are things the 
government used to do, but they gave this responsibility to the association.”21
The push for a sector- wide standardization of wages was one of the most 
significant tasks taken on by the association, and it required intense negotia-
tions among firms. The instability in the labor market was most problematic 
from the point of view of large employers,22 since smaller enterprises would 
frequently poach their skilled workers. As a sympathetic employer ex-
plained, “Every year in the busy season, workers would go on strike, and 
nearby manufacturers would not hesitate to use high salaries to poach 
skilled workers. If we did not sit down and bargain, it would be difficult for 
the entire eyeglass industry to continue on.”23 Following the lead of the 
Wenling Woolen Sweater Sectoral Union, the decision was made to establish 
an eyeglass sectoral union. Leaving no doubt about where the initiative 
came from, the official document approving the establishment of the Rui’an 
Eyeglass Sectoral Union is addressed to the Eyeglass Employers Association.
The next item of business was holding collective wage negotiations. The 
union conducted an investigation into wage levels in the various eyeglass 
enterprises, speaking with managers and workers and conducting a survey. 
The information was analyzed, and the union put forth a proposal for uni-
fied piece rates for 318 specific work operations. After soliciting comments 
and holding a few negotiation sessions, in September 2005 the respective 
19 “Jianli hangye zhidaihui, gongchuang hexie laodong guanxi” (Establish sectoral worker representa-
tive congress, build harmonious labor relations together), April 29, 2009.
20 Interview, July 2009.
21 Interview, July 2009.
22 It is not coincidental that the CEO of one of the largest manufacturers in the city, Chen Chengwei, 
was also the chairman of the Eyeglass Employers Association.
23 “Zhejiang goujian hexie laozi guanxi chutan” (First explorations in Zhejiang’s construction of har-
monious labor relations), ban yue tan, February 5, 2008.
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chairs of the employer association and the sectoral union signed a final con-
tract.
Although appearing reluctant to discuss disagreements among employ-
ers, the chair of the association did admit that some small employers re-
fused to participate in the sectoral wage agreement. Since the employer 
association is not a government agency, it could not “force them to sign.”24 
Additionally, he conceded that of the 130 eyeglass manufacturers in Rui’an, 
about 30 are not members of the association. That being said, cooperation 
between the employer association, trade union, and perhaps most impor-
tant, government and Communist Party officials, eventually resulted in a le-
gally binding collective wage agreement.
The actual content of the contract is very limited, as it consists of only five 
articles. Article 1 simply states the two- year time period during which the 
contract is in effect. Article 2 is the meat of the contract and says that work-
ers will be remunerated according to the piece rate established in the “2009 
Rui’an City Eyeglasses Employers Association Enterprise Piece- Rate Form.” 
Article 3 says that workers must be paid on time but if an enterprise is hav-
ing “difficulty,” payment of wages can be delayed after consultation with the 
union. Article 4 states that the contract is legally binding. Article 5 specifies 
that disputes should be handled according to the law.
Four years after the conclusion of the collective wage agreement, the 
unions, government, and employers were very pleased with the results. The 
official story is that previous illegal actions on the part of employers, such as 
holding employees’ ID cards or taking deposits, have been eliminated. 
Turnover was greatly reduced, which stabilized production. In an official 
report from 2010 the union claimed, “Since enacting collective wage nego-
tiation in Rui’an’s eyeglass sector in 2005, the entire industry has had peace-
ful employment, smooth production, and employees’ wages have increased 
with the development of the economy and the enterprise: ‘a rising tide has 
lifted all boats.’”25 The report continued, “Collective negotiation in the eye-
glass enterprise has served as a positive model to help spur the development 
of sectoral wage negotiations in Wenzhou municipality.”26 Somewhat coun-
terintuitively, the chair of the Eyeglass Employers Association stated, “The 
boss can’t just call the shots . . . [and he or she] can’t just fire people at 
will.”27 Rather, employers and workers alike were bound by the official pro-
cess of negotiation. Not only were local officials satisfied, they received sepa-
rate visits from the deputy chair of the national- level Financial, Commercial, 
Light Industry, Textile and Tobacco Workers’ Union and a member of the 
Zhejiang People’s Consultative Congress. Despite this official praise there 
was just one problem: the contract was not being enforced.
24 Interview, July 2009.
25 Cixi Federation of Trade Unions. Accessed at http://zgh.cixi.gov.cn/art/2010/6/24/art_9476 
_423891.html (January 2013).
26 Ibid.
27 Interview, July 2009.
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Nonenforcement
During my first brief foray into the field in Rui’an, I only interviewed offi-
cials from the labor department, the trade union, and the employer associa-
tion. But as soon as I began to meet with other employers in the area it 
became clear that things on the ground were not as I had been led to be-
lieve. The first outside interview I conducted was at Huangwei Eyeglasses. 
Not only had the general manager never heard of the sectoral agreement, 
he stated unambiguously that Huangwei did not use piece rates at all (as 
dictated by the collective agreement) but, rather, hourly rates.
As I interviewed manager after manager over the next several weeks, I 
discovered that not only were very few employers abiding by the agreement, 
hardly any of them had even heard of it. Managers from the largest enter-
prises with up to 500 workers and those from small firms with only 80 em-
ployees were equally confused by my inquiries about collective wage 
negotiations. Nor were they familiar with the “2009 Rui’an City Eyeglasses 
Employers Association Enterprise Piece- Rate Form,” the supporting docu-
ment that set common piece rates for the entire industry. Even managers 
from Zhilian Eyeglasses (one of the two large enterprises that promoted the 
idea of a sectoral collective wage agreement) told me during a factory visit 
that their wages were higher than those of other neighboring factories, indi-
cating that they were not abiding by any industry standards.
The production workers (essentially all of whom were migrants) were 
equally unaware of the existence of such an agreement. In my many eve-
nings hanging out with workers at the pool tables in Mayu’s industrial zone, 
I quickly learned that the topic of collective contracts and trade unions 
would elicit no response. On my first night, I asked a few workers from a 
nearby glasses factory about the collective contract. Not only were they un-
aware of the existence of a collective contract, they said that in their factory 
workers did not sign contracts at all but, rather, that it was based on “trust.”28
Additionally, and in contrast to what Rui’an union officials had told me, 
very few of the enterprises had established a union branch. Many employers 
claimed that unions were only set up in the larger enterprises because they 
are more “by the books” (zhenggui). One manager from a small enterprise 
with fewer than 100 employees had this to say about a union branch: “At the 
moment we don’t have one; we can’t set it up,”29 indicating that establishing 
a union required resources that smaller enterprises do not have. While the 
municipal- level union officials had claimed that they used the negotiations 
over the collective wage agreement as an opportunity to establish more 
enterprise- level union branches, I did not find any evidence of new organiz-
ing initiatives.
The firms that I had contact with all confirmed that they were members 
of the employer association. As the epicenter of Rui’an’s eyeglass industry, 
28 Field notes, December 2009.
29 Interview, January 2010.
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Mayu had the highest level of social capital, and it was where the activities of 
the employer association were focused. Employers’ assessments of the asso-
ciation varied from mild to enthusiastic support. Most commented on the 
association helping them to learn about new policies and new market op-
portunities, but nobody mentioned its role in establishing industry stan-
dards. All members had to pay dues that were adjusted based on the size of 
the enterprise. Thus, employers’ lack of familiarity with the collective wage 
agreement cannot be attributed to their nonparticipation in the employer 
association.
The lack of enforcement of sectoral wage standards was further high-
lighted by employers’ frequently expressed angst over one of the main prob-
lems that the agreement had originally set out to resolve: high turnover of 
skilled workers. Senior managers from both small and large enterprises 
complained about workers jumping ship. One manager from an enterprise 
with 110 workers described the problem as “very serious” and “very trouble-
some” but said that “there is nothing to be done. . . . [Workers] have 
freedom.”30 Large employers were even more agitated about the pilfering of 
workers. Wu, a veteran of more than 20 years in the eyeglass industry, had 
worked for the two largest eyeglass manufacturers in the city, Zhilian and 
Huakai. Both enterprises have workforces exceeding 300. Wu described in 
detail how these two enterprises are among the only factories that have ex-
tensive worker- training programs. During the busy season, however, small 
enterprises will try to offer marginally higher piece rates to their skilled 
workers to lure them away. According to Wu, the first question these small 
enterprises ask potential employees is, “Have you worked for Zhilian or 
Huakai?,”31 as this is a strong indication of how well trained they are. In gen-
eral, nobody claimed that the problem of jumping ship had improved in 
recent years (in the time since the conclusion of the collective wage agree-
ment), with some saying that things had not changed and others expressing 
that the situation had gotten much worse.
In sum, it is clear that the sectoral- level wage agreement that was so highly 
touted by officials from the Rui’an Federation of Trade Unions and the Eye-
glass Employers Association was not being enforced. Despite the exertion of 
extensive efforts by official representatives, the agreement exists on paper 
only.
Discussion
The emergence of sectoral- level wage negotiation has been possible in the 
seemingly unlikely terrain of small- commodity production in Zhejiang be-
cause of the region’s distinct model of development, referred to as “local 
entrepreneurialism.” In particular, the origin of investment, level of eco-
nomic diversification, and existence of legitimate employer associations are 
30 Interview, January 2010.
31 Field notes, December 2009.
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key determinants. I have demonstrated that Zhejiang, and in particular the 
southeastern part of the province, has been largely dependent on indige-
nous entrepreneurs in their process of development. Although the local 
state’s degree of “autonomy” is up for debate, the local character of capital 
allows for it to be highly embedded (Evans 1995). In addition, the high level 
of social capital among employers has provided the union with a representa-
tive bargaining partner in the form of local employer associations. Given the 
high density of a particular industry in a very small geographic region, 
township- level governments are highly dependent on the sustainable devel-
opment of the given industry in order to maintain their tax base. These con-
ditions do not hold in many other places in China—notably in Guangdong, 
where unions cannot bargain with highly cosmopolitan and fractured em-
ployers at the sectoral level.
And yet the question remains as to why the sectoral agreement in Rui’an 
has not been enforced, despite its being in the interest of the local govern-
ment and a significant segment of employers. A major cause of nonenforce-
ment seems to be a crisis of representation in the union. The Rui’an Eyeglass 
Sectoral Union never involved or substantively consulted with its member-
ship in the negotiation effort. To refer to eyeglass workers in Rui’an as 
“members” is even a bit of an overstatement, as they did not pay dues, were 
not aware of the fact that they were members, and were completely unaware 
that representatives were acting on their behalf. The union did exert quite a 
lot of effort in negotiating the contract, but this performance was directed 
at other government agencies, the employer association, and higher levels 
of the trade union, not toward the workers. As a result, there was no pressure 
from below on employers to abide by the agreement. Indeed, it’s not clear 
that workers would have supported the agreement, as the rather anarchic 
status quo could potentially be beneficial for skilled workers. The union would 
have to reach an agreement amenable to its members in order for them to 
have the impetus to monitor implementation within the enterprise.
Why then, if the Rui’an contract is not being enforced, is this research sig-
nificant? Whether or not enforcement is a problem, the institutional re-
sponse of the union is quite different in Zhejiang from what it is in Guangdong 
and other places in China. We can see in Rui’an that unions are groping 
about for an institutional response to labor market instability. Even though 
the benefits of such a response failed to materialize in Rui’an, evidence in-
dicates that unions have been more effective in neighboring towns (Liu 
2010; Pringle 2011). While Zhejiang unions are developing the institutional 
framework for regularized sectoral- level negotiation, Guangdong unions 
have, despite their efforts, failed in this endeavor.
Conclusion
Although China’s system of labor relations is quite distinct from that of lib-
eral democracies, existing literature on sectoral bargaining in liberal de-
mocracies is a useful starting point for understanding the situation in China. 
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As with the European cases, we can see how, in China, state capacity and 
collective- action problems for employers can serve as the impetus to estab-
lish sectoral negotiation. Additionally, we can witness the crucial role that 
representative employer associations play in China as they do elsewhere. 
But in addition to the questions of organizational interest and capacity that 
have received more attention in the literature, I have drawn attention to the 
way in which external economic conditions can either encourage or inhibit 
the realization of such arrangements. In particular, patterns of capital mo-
bility, origin of investment, and levels of economic diversification in a par-
ticular region are key variables that can facilitate or restrict the capacity to 
establish sectoral agreements. Such structural conditions are likely to be im-
portant in settings beyond China, and they may be increasingly important 
in an era in which national economies are highly subject to global forces.
Perhaps more specific to the post- socialist context, unions in such coun-
tries face distinct political challenges when it comes to the issue of enforce-
ment. We have seen how sectoral- level collective negotiation is both attractive 
and possible for such unions: attractive in the sense that they can avoid mo-
bilizing membership and possible in that—under the right economic condi-
tions—the administrative power of the union and state can be deployed in 
reaching agreements with employer associations. And yet, it is precisely 
unions’ deep integration with the state that allows such agreements to come 
into existence while simultaneously undermining the possibility of their en-
forcement. In the case of the Rui’an Eyeglass Sectoral Union, workers were 
completely excluded from the process of contract negotiation and thus had 
no capacity to play a political role in contract enforcement.
To return to Traxler (1998), we see that the eyeglass industry in Rui’an 
has a supportive state and a strong employer association, thus suggesting 
that multiemployer bargaining might be possible. But the arrangement col-
lapses without the final actor—a strong union. (Recall that the union in this 
case was started by the employers.) This then raises the question of just how 
strong a union needs to be in order to for multiemployer bargaining to be 
effective. Similarly, Behrens (2004) argued that employers will tend to asso-
ciate in response to strong unions, state initiative, or collective- action prob-
lems. While the latter two conditions pushed Rui’an employers to associate, 
the absence of the former undermined the initiative to establish common 
standards—thus the collective- action problem persists. Such a dilemma will 
likely appear in other places and industries in China and perhaps in post- 
socialist countries more broadly.
One shortcoming of this research is that it does not integrate an analysis 
of the role of public policy in setting standards. Particularly in a context 
such as China, with its strong state and weak civil society, policy is likely to 
have a major impact on the development of labor relations. To take one re-
cent example, beginning in 2013 the Guangzhou municipal government 
attempted to directly establish wage levels in the sanitation sector in re-
sponse to recurrent labor unrest. This suggests that ineffectual unions may 
come to be sidelined by increasingly impatient local governments. Assessing 
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the interaction between public policy, unions, and sectoral negotiation is a 
promising line of future inquiry.
As for future developments, unions throughout China must respond to 
demands from ACFTU leadership to increase the number of workers cov-
ered by collective contracts. Although Zhejiang unions are likely to respond 
to directives from the center through sectoral- level negotiation, unions in 
areas with higher levels of FDI will largely pursue enterprise- based collective 
negotiation. Since 2011, there have been attempts to establish sectoral ne-
gotiation in Guangzhou’s electronics industry, although only at the district 
level.32 It seems unlikely that this and other ongoing experiments will be 
successful. It is clear that trade unions, employers, and governments in di-
verse regions are constructing distinct labor relations infrastructures in a 
process that is highly constrained by local economic conditions.
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